Design of a reputation-based coalition game to detect and prevent insider jamming attacks in mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is susceptible to jamming attacks launched by adversaries with the aim of inhibiting data transmissions. As a result of this susceptibility, security in MANET is challenging due to the ability of these adversaries to gather necessary intelligence to launch insider jamming attacks. Although, there has been considerable work done in the detection of external jamming attacks, the solutions to prevent external attacks on MANET are not applicable for defense against insider jamming attacks. This challenge results in the need for a formal framework to characterize the information required by adversaries to launch insider jamming attacks in the bid to detect and prevent such attacks. In this thesis work, a framework for a novel reputation-based coalition game between multiple players in a MANET to prevent internal attacks caused by an erstwhile legitimate node is presented. The work follows a game-theoretic approach by forming a grand coalition which will make a strategic security defense decision by depending on the stored transmission rate and reputation for individual nodes in the coalition. Insider jammers are excluded when guilty nodes’ reputation falls below the allowable threshold value. Results show that the simulation of the reputation-based coalition game would help improve the network's defense strategy while also reducing false positives that results from the incorrect classification of unfortunate legitimate nodes as insider jammers.^
Computer engineering|Electrical engineering
Taiwo R Oyedare,
"Design of a reputation-based coalition game to detect and prevent insider jamming attacks in mobile ad hoc networks"
ETD Collection for Tennessee State University.